Filed under: International Relations and Security, Middle East, Peace and Conflict, Uncategorized, Arab Spring, Israel's Image, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Jewish state, Middle East, Ron Prosor
May 29, 2012 • 1:03 pm 0
Improving Israel’s Image: Myths, Truths, and Obstacles
May 24, 2012 • 11:15 pm 0
Iran and Israel: the Baghdad P5+1 talks fail
I just returned from a very intense three-day visit to Israel with a delegation of researchers from various EU think tanks. We met with researchers from the research unit of the Israeli foreign ministry, with top Israeli academics from the Hebrew University, Tel Aviv University, and the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya, as well as with authors, diplomats and politicians. While opinions ranged from left to right on the Israeli political spectrum, allowing us a full perspective of the complexity of the domestic political situation in Israel, there was little disagreement about the most important issue of the day: the Iranian threat.
Most of the experts that we talked to expressed hopes that Iran would come around in the negotiations, that sanctions would work, and that Israel would be spared of acting militarily. However, few—if any—of those we talked to (even the leftists) seemed to believe that an Israeli strike on Iran was very far away. Most even advocated it as a necessary option to neutralize the Iranian threat.
When faced with the possibility that an Israeli strike would have the opposite effect; to only slow down the current Iranian program for a few months while also ensuring that Iran will step up efforts to develop nuclear weapons in the future, most of the analysts seemed unfazed. When faced with a gamble, said one, you have to act; as a politician, he said, you cannot gamble and lose.
One of the experts, a nuclear scientist, clearly explained that if the P5+1 negotiations (the Five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany) in Baghdad fail, Israel will have to act sooner rather than later, most likely sometimes in June. He believed that Israel and the US would act together and that much of the Israeli current rhetoric is aimed at convincing the US that there is no choice but to strike Iran.
Thus, if the talks in Baghdad stall, he pointed out, another meeting will likely be scheduled for June, but most likely, Israel cannot wait that long. The parties to the negotiations in Baghdad today walked away with no agreement other than a promise to meet in Moscow on June 18-19. While the West failed to get Iran to agree to a stepped up inspections program, Iran failed to get the West to agree to the easing of sanctions in return for such access.
Lets hope the Israeli experts are wrong.
For more details of these talks see these articles in the New York Times, and the Times of Israel
Filed under: Uncategorized, Baghdad talks, Iran's nuclear threat, Israel-Iran, nuc, P5+1 negotiations
May 24, 2012 • 5:09 pm 0
Armageddon and the Stalemate: Time as a Conflict Strategy
In this post, written for the Times of Israel, I argue that we need to continue to make efforts to get Palestinians and Israelis back to the negotiation table. Even if it perhaps may seem so, continued stalemate and time does not work in favor of either party in the long run.
For the entire text, see my post in the Times of Israel
Filed under: Concepts and theories applied, International Relations and Security, Middle East, Peace and Conflict, Religion and Politics, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Israeli-Palestinian relations, Negotiation, negotiation stalemate, The peace process
May 11, 2012 • 5:37 pm 0
Why is the EU ‘irrelevant’ for Israel?

In this article, published with the EU Institute for Security Studies, I argue that the EU must develop a better understanding of Israeli domestic political constraints and set itself clearer goals and objectives if it is to have real influence in the Middle East peace process.
See the entire article here
Filed under: International Relations and Security, Middle East, Peace and Conflict, EU-Israel relations, European Neighbourhood policy, European Union, International, Israel-Palestine, The EU-Israel Action Plan, The EU-Israel Association Agreement
February 29, 2012 • 11:19 pm 0
Hawks, Doves and Israeli Politicians
My new Op-ed in Jerusalem Post talks about the classic IR dilemma of doves and hawks. In a time of war-mongering and saber-rattling leading up to violence and hostilities, doves are often silenced and accused of being traitors, while hawks are often emboldened. As a result, the prospects for victory and success of the use of force is often over-estimated, while risks and costs are underestimated. History (not so distant) teaches us that this tends to lead to use of force that is badly planned and lacking an exit strategy. This article describes the dilemma that is currently facing Israel’s top politicians, Ehud Barak, and Benyamin Netanyahu, as they consider the country’s strategy towards Iran.
Two errors appear in the article: Obviously, Paul Wolfewitz was the deputy secretary of defense (Editor mistake) The article by Ronen Bergman was in New York Times Magazine (error was mine)Filed under: Concepts and theories applied, International Relations and Security, Middle East, Peace and Conflict, A Nuclear Iran, Hawks and Doves, Israel's Iran policy, Israeli foreign policy
February 22, 2012 • 9:54 am 0
Remembering Anthony Shahid
Mr. Shadid, a two-time winner of the Pulitzer Prize, spent most of his professional life covering the Middle East and was esteemed throughout his career for being an insightful analyst. His colleagues, friends and readers remember the journalist and just what made him so special.
Click here for this New York Times special
Filed under: Uncategorized, New York Times, Shadid
January 26, 2012 • 9:46 am 0
The Worrying Trend: Europeans and Israel
See my post on the Mideast Matrix: Commentary and analysis on Middle East politics, a blog about the Middle East run by Jeremy Pressman, and Brent Sasley. My article “The Worrying Trend: Europeans and Israel” looks at the European reactions and understanding of the difficult domestic situation within Israel and how that situation influences the peace process:
Related Articles:
IDF soldiers should have shot rioting Jewish extremists, MK says (Haaretz)
Commander to Soldiers: Never Fire at Jews (Ynet News)
Right-wing extremists attack IDF Base in West Bank (Jerusalem Post)
Israeli Leaders Sets New Curbs on Settlers for Violence (New York Times)
Barak: Israel Must treat Jewish Extremists like a Terror Group (Haaretz)
Filed under: Middle East, Peace and Conflict, Religion and Politics, European-Israeli Relations, Israel, Israel-Palestine, Middle East, Religion and Politics, Territorial Conflict, Warfare and Conflict
January 12, 2012 • 5:17 pm 1
Explaining Why Negotiations Fail in the Most Intractable Cases
The academic literature is full of suggestions why resolving violent conflict is difficult and why negotiations fail. Although a clear classification of the various explanations into neat categories would be almost impossible, it is helpful to look at some of the overarching themes that can fit most explanations under their umbrellas. This is especially helpful when we try to apply negotiation theory to practice, particularly when attempting to understand why some negotiation processes succeed while others fail. Why are some conflicts seemingly more intractable than others, and why do negotiations over such conflicts often fail? The conflict management and negotiation literature attribute conflict intractability and negotiation failure to a number of different variables that for the purpose of this analysis can be summarized as having to do with the process, the timing, and the nature of the issues under negotiation.
Those explanations that argue that conflict intractability can be attributed to the negotiation process itself often focus on the failure to move the adversaries from a zero-sum or distributive process to one that is more “win-win” or integrative in character. The failure to change the negotiation dynamics is said to be the consequence of various factors that have to do with the behavioral patterns of the adversaries, including entrapment, posturing, unwillingness to compromise, and the lack of credibility or trust. According to this perspective, indivisibility and intractability arise from how contentious issues are represented by the parties rather than being inherent in the issues themselves.
Explanations that look at the timing as being the major explanation for negotiation failure often stress the conflict dynamics itself as being the key for making negotiation more or less fruitful at various points in a conflict cycle. While this perspective does not discount either the behavioral aspect of the parties, or the nature of the contentious issues as contributing to intractability, it argues that negotiation will have a higher chance to succeed if it is done at the “Ripe Moment,” when the cost of continued stalemate is higher than the price that has to be paid from compromise. The timing approach combines both strategy and tactics, and is particularly useful for third parties and mediators in determining when to apply pressure on the parties in order to raise the cost of an escalation in violence.
The third approach, is the argument that the nature of issues plays an important role in explaining why some conflicts are more difficult to negotiation than others. One of the stronger findings within this research perspective is the growing evidence that territoriality may be one of the most important factors for understanding both conflict incidence and intractability. Various findings show that territorial issues are more conflictual than other types of issues, and that they tend to reach higher levels of violence. Territorial conflicts are also more likely to recur and tend to prompt more frequent crises in rivalries between states. However, territory by itself is not necessarily intractable; logically, if conflicts were simply over where to draw a border on a map, or even over the division of natural resources, even territorial conflicts would be quite simple to resolve. However, in the contemporary world, most territorial conflicts tend to be remnants of larger power struggles, where some national and ethnic groups have lost out and as a consequence suffered humiliation and exile from the territory that they consider their homeland. The most intractable conflicts in the world today—and the ones that tend to be the most long-standing—are the ones that involves disputes over territory that has taken on sacred and symbolic characteristics for the parties involved and where it is impossible to separate territorial attachments from ethnic and national identity.
In such conflicts ethno-territorial attachments are strengthened through a historic process of suffering and strife that feed into the conflict cycle to make stakes indivisible and even absolute. A territorial absolute can be defined as a disputed space that, through myths, symbols and/or spiritual practices or beliefs, has become so intrinsic to the identity of a group that it can only be treated as an indivisible “whole.”
The reasons why negotiations almost always fail to bring an agreement in such conflicts, is because the absolute character of the stake prevents the parties from exercising the flexibility needed in order to produce a formula that can provide even the minimum conditions that would be acceptable for both sides. Traditional negotiation theory that focuses on integrative solutions treats indivisibility more as a challenge than a hurdle, with the idea that divisibility can be added to most conflicts using substitution, exchange, or compensation. For territorial absolutes however, such measures are not possible, because for groups with absolute perceptions about territory often choose to defend the territory with their lives. Absolutes do not have a price that can be negotiated.

The Zone of Agreement (ZOA) between two negotiation parties falls in the intersection of the circles (©Norlen)
The second aspect that adds to the intractability of most conflicts over territorial absolutes comes from the way absolutes were created. Because they were developed over long periods of time and as a response to conflict and strife, conquest and exile, the same exact piece of territory is often regarded as absolute by competing groups. If we take the Palestinians and the Israelis as an example, the conflict is deeply tied to territoriality and both parties claim the same land exclusively, and that land is tied to their national and religious identity. Their interests are in this respect identical and negatively defined based on the exclusion of the ‘other’ from that space. The same rocks and buildings are considered sacred to both sides and are imperative to each side’s national narrative. While the conflict literature shows that the redrawing of borders between warring parties is not difficult in and of itself, it is the inherent value of the territory within those borders that adds to the intractability. Once a disputed territory becomes imbued with ethno-religious attachments, it can no longer be divided through a simple measuring exercise on a map.
Third parties have a lot to learn in order to become more effective in dealing with conflicts over territorial absolutes. While the timing, the attitude and behavior of the parties, as well as the structure of the conflict, are all essential dimensions for improving the chances of successful negotiation outcomes, absolutes may be essentially immune to most of the already tried and tested methods. It is therefore time that we broaden the horizon and look at how we can accommodate the absolute rather than the absolute accommodating to us. When it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict we have reached a low point when the formula that has traditionally been the basis for talks no longer occupies the space between the minimum conditions acceptable by each party. In other words, the zone of agreement (ZOA) is non-existent. The old formula was based on the idea that two states would be created and that the territory would be divided in order to accommodate the sovereignty of each state. It is becoming increasingly clear that that such a division of territory (at least on a permanent basis) may no longer be achievable. Whether the new formula needs to be a one-state, two-state, or no-state solution is not yet clear. What is clear however, is that the international community and the two parties themselves are going to have to come up with a new creative framework that does a better job at taking the territorial complexities of the conflict into full account.
Filed under: Concepts and theories applied, International Relations and Security, Middle East, Peace and Conflict, Religion and Politics, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Middle East, Negotiation, Territorial dispute
January 10, 2012 • 10:18 am 0
Death of Peace Process Means Opportunity for New Ideas
My Op-Ed, published in the Jerusalem Post today, talks about the need for a new formula to replace the two-state solution. Israel, in its position as the more powerful of the two parties, has a unique opportunity to shape that formula, or to present the Palestinians and the rest of the world with their prefered scenario.
http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-EdContributors/Article.aspx?id=252884
Related articles
Filed under: Concepts and theories applied, International Relations and Security, Middle East, Peace and Conflict, Religion and Politics, Jerusalem Post, The Israeli-Palestinian peace process, Two-state solution
December 14, 2011 • 11:49 am 0
To Make Mideast Peace, West must drop basic assumptions
A slightly shortened version of of my opinion piece that was published on the EUISS website was published by the Jerusalem Post on December 13th, 2011:
http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-EdContributors/Article.aspx?ID=249165&R=R1
Filed under: International Relations and Security, Middle East, Peace and Conflict, Religion and Politics, Mahmoud Abbas, Middle East, Palestinian people, West Bank







