The East•West•Middle

Commentary on international security, International Relations and the Middle East from an American, European, and Middle Eastern perspective

Armageddon and the Stalemate: Time as a Conflict Strategy

In this post, written for the Times of Israel, I argue that we need to continue to make efforts to get Palestinians and Israelis back to the negotiation table. Even if it perhaps may seem so, continued stalemate and time does not work in favor of either party in the long run.

For the entire text, see my post in the Times of Israel

Filed under: Concepts and theories applied, International Relations and Security, Middle East, Peace and Conflict, Religion and Politics, , , , ,

The Worrying Trend: Europeans and Israel

Protests in Paris against the raid of the Gaza Flotilla in May 2010 (BBC)

See my post on the Mideast Matrix: Commentary and analysis on Middle East politics, a blog about the Middle East run by Jeremy Pressman, and Brent Sasley. My article “The Worrying Trend: Europeans and Israel” looks at the European reactions and understanding of the difficult domestic situation within Israel and how that situation influences the peace process:

Related Articles:

IDF soldiers should have shot rioting Jewish extremists, MK says (Haaretz)

Commander to Soldiers: Never Fire at Jews (Ynet News)

Right-wing extremists attack IDF Base in West Bank (Jerusalem Post)

Israeli Leaders Sets New Curbs on Settlers for Violence (New York Times)

Barak: Israel Must treat Jewish Extremists like a Terror Group (Haaretz)

Filed under: Middle East, Peace and Conflict, Religion and Politics, , , , , , ,

Explaining Why Negotiations Fail in the Most Intractable Cases

Netanyahu and Abbas meet at the White House in September 2010 (Credits: AP)

The academic literature is full of suggestions why resolving violent conflict is difficult and why negotiations fail. Although a clear classification of the various explanations into neat categories would be almost impossible, it is helpful to look at some of the overarching themes that can fit most explanations under their umbrellas. This is especially helpful when we try to apply negotiation theory to practice, particularly when attempting to understand why some negotiation processes succeed while others fail. Why are some conflicts seemingly more intractable than others, and why do negotiations over such conflicts often fail? The conflict management and negotiation literature attribute conflict intractability and negotiation failure to a number of different variables that for the purpose of this analysis can be summarized as having to do with the process, the timing, and the nature of the issues under negotiation.

Those explanations that argue that conflict intractability can be attributed to the negotiation process itself often focus on the failure to move the adversaries from a zero-sum or distributive process to one that is more “win-win” or integrative in character. The failure to change the negotiation dynamics is said to be the consequence of various factors that have to do with the behavioral patterns of the adversaries, including entrapment, posturing, unwillingness to compromise, and the lack of credibility or trust. According to this perspective, indivisibility and intractability arise from how contentious issues are represented by the parties rather than being inherent in the issues themselves.

Explanations that look at the timing as being the major explanation for negotiation failure often stress the conflict dynamics itself as being the key for making negotiation more or less fruitful at various points in a conflict cycle. While this perspective does not discount either the behavioral aspect of the parties, or the nature of the contentious issues as contributing to intractability, it argues that negotiation will have a higher chance to succeed if it is done at the “Ripe Moment,” when the cost of continued stalemate is higher than the price that has to be paid from compromise. The timing approach combines both strategy and tactics, and is particularly useful for third parties and mediators in determining when to apply pressure on the parties in order to raise the cost of an escalation in violence.

The third approach, is the argument that the nature of issues plays an important role in explaining why some conflicts are more difficult to negotiation than others. One of the stronger findings within this research perspective is the growing evidence that territoriality may be one of the most important factors for understanding both conflict incidence and intractability. Various findings show that territorial issues are more conflictual than other types of issues, and that they tend to reach higher levels of violence. Territorial conflicts are also more likely to recur and tend to prompt more frequent crises in rivalries between states. However, territory by itself is not necessarily intractable; logically, if conflicts were simply over where to draw a border on a map, or even over the division of natural resources, even territorial conflicts would be quite simple to resolve. However, in the contemporary world, most territorial conflicts tend to be remnants of larger power struggles, where some national and ethnic groups have lost out and as a consequence suffered humiliation and exile from the territory that they consider their homeland. The most intractable conflicts in the world today—and the ones that tend to be the most long-standing—are the ones that involves disputes over territory that has taken on sacred and symbolic characteristics for the parties involved and where it is impossible to separate territorial attachments from ethnic and national identity.

In such conflicts ethno-territorial attachments are strengthened through a historic process of suffering and strife that feed into the conflict cycle to make stakes indivisible and even absolute. A territorial absolute can be defined as a disputed space that, through myths, symbols and/or spiritual practices or beliefs, has become so intrinsic to the identity of a group that it can only be treated as an indivisible “whole.”

The reasons why negotiations almost always fail to bring an agreement in such conflicts, is because the absolute character of the stake prevents the parties from exercising the flexibility needed in order to produce a formula that can provide even the minimum conditions that would be acceptable for both sides. Traditional negotiation theory that focuses on integrative solutions treats indivisibility more as a challenge than a hurdle, with the idea that divisibility can be added to most conflicts using substitution, exchange, or compensation. For territorial absolutes however, such measures are not possible, because for groups with absolute perceptions about territory often choose to defend the territory with their lives. Absolutes do not have a price that can be negotiated.

The Zone of Agreement (ZOA) between two negotiation parties falls in the intersection of the circles (©Norlen)

The second aspect that adds to the intractability of most conflicts over territorial absolutes comes from the way absolutes were created. Because they were developed over long periods of time and as a response to conflict and strife, conquest and exile, the same exact piece of territory is often regarded as absolute by competing groups. If we take the Palestinians and the Israelis as an example, the conflict is deeply tied to territoriality and both parties claim the same land exclusively, and that land is tied to their national and religious identity. Their interests are in this respect identical and negatively defined based on the exclusion of the ‘other’ from that space. The same rocks and buildings are considered sacred to both sides and are imperative to each side’s national narrative. While the conflict literature shows that the redrawing of borders between warring parties is not difficult in and of itself, it is the inherent value of the territory within those borders that adds to the intractability. Once a disputed territory becomes imbued with ethno-religious attachments, it can no longer be divided through a simple measuring exercise on a map.

When the minimum conditions of the parties do not intersect: No Agreement (© Norlen)

Third parties have a lot to learn in order to become more effective in dealing with conflicts over territorial absolutes. While the timing, the attitude and behavior of the parties, as well as the structure of the conflict, are all essential dimensions for improving the chances of successful negotiation outcomes, absolutes may be essentially immune to most of the already tried and tested methods. It is therefore time that we broaden the horizon and look at how we can accommodate the absolute rather than the absolute accommodating to us. When it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict we have reached a low point when the formula that has traditionally been the basis for talks no longer occupies the space between the minimum conditions acceptable by each party. In other words, the zone of agreement (ZOA) is non-existent. The old formula was based on the idea that two states would be created and that the territory would be divided in order to accommodate the sovereignty of each state. It is becoming increasingly clear that that such a division of territory (at least on a permanent basis) may no longer be achievable. Whether the new formula needs to be a one-state, two-state, or no-state solution is not yet clear. What is clear however, is that the international community and the two parties themselves are going to have to come up with a new creative framework that does a better job at taking the territorial complexities of the conflict into full account.

Filed under: Concepts and theories applied, International Relations and Security, Middle East, Peace and Conflict, Religion and Politics, , , ,

Death of Peace Process Means Opportunity for New Ideas

My Op-Ed, published in the Jerusalem Post today, talks about the need for a new formula to replace the two-state solution. Israel, in its position as the more powerful of the two parties, has a unique opportunity to shape that formula, or to present the Palestinians and the rest of the world with their prefered scenario.

http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-EdContributors/Article.aspx?id=252884

Filed under: Concepts and theories applied, International Relations and Security, Middle East, Peace and Conflict, Religion and Politics, , ,

To Make Mideast Peace, West must drop basic assumptions

 

Photo by: REUTERS/Mohamed Abd El-Ghany

A slightly shortened version of of my opinion piece that was published on the EUISS website was published by the Jerusalem Post on December 13th, 2011:
http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-EdContributors/Article.aspx?ID=249165&R=R1

Filed under: International Relations and Security, Middle East, Peace and Conflict, Religion and Politics, , , ,

Three Things The West Continues To Get Wrong In The Peace Process

More than coffee needed for a successful peace process

Many erroneous assumptions are made about the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process. Only by letting go of these assumptions can Europe and America make any real headway in laying the ground for peace. Tova Norlén examines three of the most frequently misused assumptions.

To read the analysis, click here:

http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/three-things-the-west-continues-to-get-wrong-in-the-peace-process/

Filed under: Concepts and theories applied, International Relations and Security, Middle East, Peace and Conflict, Religion and Politics

Keep Dreaming: Taking religion seri… JPost – Magazine – Opinion

Interesting analysis about where Israel is heading in terms of growing religiosity, written by vice chairman of the World Zionist Organization, David Breakstone:

Keep Dreaming: Taking religion seri… JPost – Magazine – Opinion.

Filed under: Middle East, Religion and Politics

Israel’s “Jordanian Option” twisted and shaped to your liking

"Transjordan" was separated from the British of Mandate of Palestine in 1920, preventing further Jewish immigration to the area.

In 2005, when doing research among Israeli national religious settlers most of my interviewees could not come up with a coherent answer when asked what they considered the best practical solution between the Israelis and Palestinians. The problem however, was not because they had never thought about it, but because they considered the question utterly irrelevant. By asking the question, I revealed a leftist secular “bias” which made them suspicious about my intentions and thus unwilling to share with me their real perspective, which was based on ultimate and absolute religious “truth.” When one person finally took some time off from preaching (as a result of my entirely naïve and secular question), he explained that he did not believe that Hashem would allow a continuation of the current outrageous situation for too much longer. It is clear, he said, that redemption is on its way, Jews are flocking to the Biblical territories, a major war seems to be brewing, and the Arabs will be driven out “naturally” as they were in 1967.

Because I was surprised that they had not at least tried to make up a preferable political scenario in order to wage the war against the seculars, I still pressed on, and insisted that he come up with an alternative, should the dreams for the “miraculous” docility and/or disappearance of the Palestinian population by either force or redemption, not pan out within the foreseeable future. A bit sheepishly, he mechanically shared an unconvincing plan of Jordanian nationalism for those Palestinians who would accept to remain inside of Eretz Israel (the Land of Israel promised in the Bible). However, he added, most Palestinians when presented with the option, would chose to leave which would reduce the Palestinian problem to an insignificant minimum. Those who did opt to remain, he explained, would be given “guest status” as foreigners in the Jewish state according to the Biblical tradition. This is nothing new, he noted, as the Jewish people always had aliens among them who respected that only Jews could be the owners of this land. The reason why this option has not worked out yet he said is because of the hostility of the Arab states that have refused to accept the Palestinians as citizens. After all, he added, Palestinians never existed as a separate Arab people before the birth of Israel.

When Israeli politicians and analysts raise the Jordanian option as an alternative to the two-state solution we need to be aware that there are (at least) two different “Jordanian options” and although both are currently un-feasible, it is important to recognize how they differ. Recently, as the Jerusalem Post reported, retired Israeli general Uzi Dayan suggested that because the Oslo Process has essentially failed, Israel should be negotiating with Jordan to accept the West Bank and Gaza as Jordanian provinces. While such an idea is indeed not novel and was long considered the “preferred alternative” for Israelis, it completely ignores the fact that Jordan officially renounced its claims on the West Bank territory in 1987 in response to the PLO acceptance of Israel and the two-state solution (the Gaza Strip was never part of Jordan’s claim). Should that not be enough of a reminder, King Abdullah II promptly warned the Israelis against getting to excited about the idea, by saying, “Jordan will never be a substitute land for anyone […] We should speak loudly and not allow such an idea to remain in the minds of some of us. Jordan is Jordan, and Palestine is Palestine.” Although they may share the same language, those who consider themselves native Jordanians are not Palestinian, but Hashemite. Just like Israel, taking in large territories of Palestinian nationals would thus threaten the demographic balance in Jordan at a time when the rest of the region is undergoing democratic transition and populist uprisings. Thus, while for Israelis it may seem convenient to have the Jordanians inherit the Palestinian problem, such a solution is most likely to be temporary and may even present a greater security risk to Israel in the long-run. However, given the relative trust that exists between Israel and Jordan, Israeli wishful thinking about the Jordanian option is understandable.

Jordanian King Abdullah II

However, while the discussion about the Jordanian option may still be legitimate despite the King’s objections, it needs to be pointed out that this is not what my national religious settler had in mind when he explained “his” Jordanian option. Rather, simply put, his argument is that if Jordan is “declared” the Palestinian homeland, the West Bank population will have no choice but to go there. On Monday, in response to King Abdullah’s warning Isreali MK Aryeh Eldad (National Union) advised the King that he should “declare Jordan the home of the Palestinian nation today, or seek refuge in London, while he is still in control of his own fate.” “Jordan is Palestine” he declared, and “Abdullah knows very well that there is no other justification for Jordan’s existence.” It is this perspective that Eldad recently touted to US Congressional members during a visit to Washington DC. The response among American lawmakers was overwhelmingly positive, he claimed. According to Arutz Sheva, American representatives had “showed great interest in the idea of Jordan providing a homeland for those who identify as Palestinian.” Although the degree to which US members of congress seem to receive advice from Israeli political right-wingers who tout radical racist political ideologies is quite worrying, this is outside the scope of today’s topic. What is more of a concern here is the degree to which sections of the Israeli national religious right are entirely detached from the reality of the political and human situation on the ground. If it is indeed true that a large majority of the Israeli electorate (as my interviewees claimed) accept and support their assertion that redemption is near and that it is legitimate (according to Jewish law) to exile (or transfer) a non-Jewish population from the land they have been living on for generations, we have a huge problem not just for the peace process, but for Israel’s very legitimacy and survival. The frequency at which these options are presented as valid and “lawful” solutions to the conflict by members of the political establishment is increasing and, as a result, for ordinary Israelis who are sick and tired of the ongoing conflict they are beginning to sound like plausible alternatives.

What the settlers are refusing to acknowledge is that the Palestinian problem is not only a “national” problem, but also a territorial problem. The Palestinians do not just want a “home,” they happen to want it in the same place that the settlers envision for themselves. Just as the Jewish people were reluctant to accept the Uganda offer made to them at the sixth Zionist Congress in 1906s, Palestinians are not going to agree to abandon the land of their ancestors and move to a neighboring state, at least not without a fight. Efforts to promote better living conditions among Palestinians so that their birth-rates will fall will not change the fact that Palestinians claim the exact same territory as Israelis as their homeland. Neither will the opposite policies of trying to curtail or reduce Palestinian economic incentives and opportunities so that they leave. The latter would only serve to create a Palestinian brain drain, where all that is left of the population are the uneducated masses who are more susceptible to radical politics. Instead, all those policies will continue to keep Palestinians in political and territorial limbo, increasingly convincing outsiders that the situation resembles the discrimination that took place under South African apartheid.

The fact is that unless the Palestinians are given a tangible territorial arrangement within the territory that they claim as their homeland, they will continue to fight for it. Does that mean that Israel has to give them all the territory they claim, or that they have to allow all the refugees to return? Clearly, at this point, even Palestinians have begun to realize that such demands are not feasible. Does that mean that those who are not allowed back will continue to long back to the cities in Israel from which their ancestors were made refugees? Of course! Just like Jews longing back to their promised land, you cannot take away the desire of Palestinian refugees to go back to those roots, especially since many people were exiled from their homes through violence through no personal fault of their own. Just as Jews have always longed back to the Promised Land so will Palestinians dream of their historic Palestine. Ironically, this fact is a side effect of Israel’s very success. If Israel insists on first “declaring victory” by pushing the Palestinians to recognize Israel’s Jewishness, or by demanding of the Palestinians that they “declare an end to the historic conflict and renounce all claims to the land,” they may find that the Palestinians have won the demographic race before a territorial agreement can be reached.

The national-religious settlers are thus living in a dreamland between biblical delusion and the harsh reality. The Gaza evacuations woke them up to the fact that their biggest enemies may not be the Palestinians, but those within Israel who are willing to challenge and change the status quo and to stop redemption in its track.

Filed under: International Relations and Security, Middle East, Peace and Conflict, Religion and Politics, , ,

The Contentious Issues: Educational Overview of the unresolved issues for future Israeli-Palestinian negotiation

For anyone seeking an explanation of the basic issues that remain contentious between Israelis and Palestinians, this New York Times interactive video presentation provides an excellent overview. It includes video footage and personal interviews with both Israelis and Palestinians and discusses borders, the security fence, settlements, and Jerusalem.

http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/09/05/world/middleeast/challenges-in-defining-an-israeli-palestinian-border.html

Filed under: Concepts and theories applied, Middle East, Peace and Conflict, Religion and Politics, , , ,

On Pidyon Shvuyim, Gilad Shalit, and Israel’s Hard Choices

Gilad Shalit salutes Primi Minister Netanyahu after his release/EPA

The return of Gilad Shalit to Israel was the conclusion of what one Israeli analyst called 1,941 nights and days of “national hysteria and insanity.” However, emotions are still soaring and the ethical debate surrounding the event will continue for some time. The facts of the deal between Israel and Hamas are rather straight forward and simple: one Israeli soldier for 1,027 Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, 1,000 men and 27 women. The lop-sidedness of this deal made Israel appear strangely vulnerable—contrary to its normal steadfastness in its negotiations with the Palestinians—as if its politicians had completely ignored the possible implications on its own security, which those against the deal have made abundantly clear. However, the ethical and political dimensions that inform the deal involve complex interpretations of current politics, security, and religious doctrine, as well as thousands of years of Jewish history. In some ways Israeli society and culture are strung on a web that is anchored between those separate dimensions, where retreat to one or the other is always a possibility, but where a shakeup in one of those corners tends to rock the whole web, and all of society with it. This entanglement is the most apparent when the nation undergoes a soul searching moment, as is clearly the case as a result of the Shalit return.

At the moment in Israel there appears to be two camps, those whose sympathies lie with the Shalit family, and who argue, in the words of President Peres, that Gilad Shalit’s life is worth much more than thousands of terrorists. On the other side of the debate are those who claim that the price is too high, a group that is primarily led by a number of prominent relatives of victims of Israeli terrorist attacks, the perpetrators of which may be among those prisoners included in the release. What is not always apparent to the non-Jewish debate is the ideological and religious foundation which both of these perspectives tap into and that is deeply embedded into the secular and political discussion.

In fact, the ransoming of captives is something that became so common throughout Jewish history that it became considered by the sages to be a great Mitzvah (Mitzvah Rabbah), a commandment that requires the sacrifice all of one’s resources if needed for its fulfillment. Rambam/Maimoinides argued that because captives suffer greatly and may be in mortal danger, the mitzvah to ransom captives takes precedence over supporting and clothing the poor. One who ignores the commandment, writes Maimonides, is guilty of transgressing commandments such as “you shall not harden your heart” (Deuteronomy 15:7) or “you shall not stand idly by the blood of your brother.” (Leviticus 19:16). However, the ancient sages soon realized that the commandment and its interpretation put the Jewish community in a difficult dilemma. Obviously, the larger the ransoms that the community offered for their captives, the more captives were taken. As a solution, the Jewish sages imposed standards by which ransoms had to be measured, specifying that no captive should be redeemed for more than their monetary value (as measured by what they would have been worth as a slave), in order to prevent the impoverishment of society and to discourage further kidnapping. Although it may seem only remotely related, this commandment is the driving force behind a variety of political and historic events, including the rescue of Jews from the Soviet Union, and now, the negotiations for the return of Gilad Shalit. While this discussion may seem archaic, it is important to remember that religion, symbolism, and tradition are seamlessly woven into the fabric of Israeli society, and are constantly being reinforced through the national socialization process. As a result of the diversity of Israeli society and the ensuing polarization of the Israeli democratic system, concessions are constantly being made to both secular and religious groups, meaning that religious symbolism and tradition are part of the national political debate.

Hence, in order to properly understand the balance sheet between justification and hesitation that has carefully been examined by Israeli politicians during the last several months it has to be seen not only through the lens of security, but also through those other dimensions that are not always well known to the rest of the world. President Shimon Peres’ remarks to the Israeli terror victims association on October 17th, explaining that the life of Gilad Shalit far outweighs the price of the released Palestinian terrorists despite the pain that it causes the many bereaved families, have to be measured against this reality. Similarly, Benyamin Netanyahu’s remarks echo the same sentiments. After successfully reuniting Gilad Shalit with his family the Prime Minister claimed, “The state of Israel is different from its enemies: Here we do not celebrate the release of murderers. Here we do not applaud those who took life. On the contrary, we believe in the sanctity of life. We sanctify life. This is the ancient tradition of the Jewish people.”

As with any issue in Israel however, the debate in Israel is extremely polarized. While on the surface it appears that the polarization falls neatly into the religious/non-religious divide, the truth is much more complicated and multi-layered. For once, the table seemed to have been turned and the mostly secular community who argued for Shalit’s release took recourse in the Torah, while national-religious and right-wing Israelis used the secular security argument to claim that the swap would be too costly. Although the justification for the cost argument is also religiously based (from the interpretation of the Tanachic dictates about the maximum price that should be paid as ransom), the measures for what is “too costly” are contemporary and determined by the national security imperative. According to that imperative there are at least four reasons why the deal should have been considered unacceptable: First, by giving in to Hamas’ demands, it gives the terrorist organization the impression that terror pays off. Second, it shows the Palestinians that violence pays, and—given the stalled Israeli-Palestinian peace talks—is more effective than negotiations. Third, the released Palestinian prisoners who have spent years in Israeli jail will go right back to their previously murderous activities, and fourth, and perhaps most importantly, by bowing to some of Hamas’ demands, Israel will appear weak and Hamas will be able to present itself as the victor, further strengthening the movement and encouraging possible repeat action. As a result the price for future swaps would continue to inflate.

Palestinian Prisoners released in exchange for Gilad Shalit (Reuters)

The fact that the national religious community is extremely negative against the swap is indeed expected. The most fervent among the national religious tend to be the ones who are most directly affected by Palestinian terrorism, as they occupy the most remote settlements inside the West Bank close to Palestinian population centers. In addition, the passion by which they defend their cause—retaining the territory at all cost—increases their tolerance for violent alternatives in the struggle against the Palestinians and the accompanying sacrifice. The options discussed within this community are therefore much more punitive and forceful, lacking consideration for the effect that such measures would have on the larger relationship with the Palestinians or on possible Israeli casualties from such operations. Thus, the religious ideals of compassion and solidarity are not useful for the larger cause that the Israeli religious right has taken upon itself.

However, together with the bereaved families, the national religious community understands something that the rest of Israel is still choosing to deny: By agreeing to this deal, Israel implicitly risks being seen as acknowledging the old adage that “one person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter.” When interviewed on Al-Jazeera on the day of the swap, the spokesman for the prime minister of Israel, Mark Regev, repeatedly pointed out that the released Hamas prisoners are in fact not political prisoners but murderers, and that it is against both international law and standards of anyone’s decency that murderers should be set free. In an open letter in Haaretz on October 17th, the father of an Israeli girl who was murdered in a terrorist attack in 2001 expressed those same sentiments when he wrote that, “In any sane country with a fair judicial system, even paroled murderers are not released without granting the victims’ loved ones a chance to address the parole board. I thought Israel was such a state.” Others have argued that by releasing convicted terrorist, Israel puts itself in defiance of International law, thereby providing a moral justification for allowing Israel to step away from its traditional Jewish values.

Israeli politicians are therefore caught between a rock and a hard place. Although it is justified in the Torah and supported by a majority of Israelis, to the outside world the argument that Gilad Shalit’s freedom is indeed worth the price of 1027 Palestinian prisoners and potential future terrorists, recalls a “regular” POW exchange where the prisoners are considered to be fighters in a legitimate struggle, albeit with a heavily inflated price. However, if, as Israel insists, these prisoners are indeed dangerous murderers who should be locked up for life because of their violent tendencies, the image that remains is one of an increasingly weakened Israel, and a much strengthened Hamas. Clearly, at some point, Israelis will have to choose between those two narratives, or Hamas will make the choice for them. For now all we can do is believe in the hope that Gilad Shalit himself expressed when he said that he is hopeful that the deal that set him free will help promote peace between Israelis and Palestinians.

Filed under: Middle East, Peace and Conflict, Religion and Politics,

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