Improving Israel’s Image: Myths, Truths, and Obstacles

 

On a recent trip to Israel, one question in particular came up over and over again: how can Israel improve its image to the rest of the world? Israeli diplomats, politicians, and academics all complained that Israel is unfairly singled out as a ‘perpetrator’ in the region, especially at a time when there are far worse atrocities being committed by other countries in the Middle East. While this is certainly true, the turmoil in the rest of the Middle East can not give Israel the excuse to ignore its own conflict, especially as it promises to serve as a major irritant in the relationship between Israel and the newly emerging Arab populist regimes. Hence, the biggest service that Israel could do to its own image would be to re-engage in the peace process with the Palestinians regardless of what happens in the rest of the Middle East.

 

Instead, many Israeli diplomats, including Israeli Ambassador to the UN, Ron Prosor, seem to feel a need to explain to the International community that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should not be prioritized; that the situation in Gaza is not as bad as it seems; that settlements should continue (as if they strengthen the peace process); and that Israel does not need to make an efforts toward peace until all Arabs and Palestinians (including the refugees) have recognized Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state.

 

For the whole text of this Blog post see my article in the Times of Israel

Filed under: International Relations and Security, Middle East, Peace and Conflict, Uncategorized, Arab Spring, Israel's Image, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Jewish state, Middle East, Ron Prosor

Iran and Israel: the Baghdad P5+1 talks fail

I just returned from a very intense three-day visit to Israel with a delegation of researchers from various EU think tanks. We met with researchers from the research unit of the Israeli foreign ministry, with top Israeli academics from the Hebrew University, Tel Aviv University, and the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya, as well as with authors, diplomats and politicians. While opinions ranged from left to right on the Israeli political spectrum, allowing us a full perspective of the complexity of the domestic political situation in Israel, there was little disagreement about the most important issue of the day: the Iranian threat.

Most of the experts that we talked to expressed hopes that Iran would come around in the negotiations, that sanctions would work, and that Israel would be spared of acting militarily. However, few—if any—of those we talked to (even the leftists) seemed to believe that an Israeli strike on Iran was very far away. Most even advocated it as a necessary option to neutralize the Iranian threat.

When faced with the possibility that an Israeli strike would have the opposite effect; to only slow down the current Iranian program for a few months while also ensuring that Iran will step up efforts to develop nuclear weapons in the future, most of the analysts seemed unfazed. When faced with a gamble, said one, you have to act; as a politician, he said, you cannot gamble and lose.

One of the experts, a nuclear scientist, clearly explained that if the P5+1 negotiations (the Five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany) in Baghdad fail, Israel will have to act sooner rather than later, most likely sometimes in June. He believed that Israel and the US would act together and that much of the Israeli current rhetoric is aimed at convincing the US that there is no choice but to strike Iran.

Thus, if the talks in Baghdad stall, he pointed out, another meeting will likely be scheduled for June, but most likely, Israel cannot wait that long. The parties to the negotiations in Baghdad today walked away with no agreement other than a promise to meet in Moscow on June 18-19. While the West failed to get Iran to agree to a stepped up inspections program, Iran failed to get the West to agree to the easing of sanctions in return for such access.

Lets hope the Israeli experts are wrong.

For more details of these talks see these articles in the New York Times, and the Times of Israel

Filed under: Uncategorized, Baghdad talks, Iran's nuclear threat, Israel-Iran, nuc, P5+1 negotiations

Remembering Anthony Shahid

Mr. Shadid, a two-time winner of the Pulitzer Prize, spent most of his professional life covering the Middle East and was esteemed throughout his career for being an insightful analyst. His colleagues, friends and readers remember the journalist and just what made him so special.

Click here for this New York Times special

Filed under: Uncategorized, New York Times, Shadid

Newt Gingrich’s “What ifs” – the EMP

Photo: DoD Photo: Newt learning how to drive a STRYKER tank

This is the most worrying, outlandish, absurd, and threatening thing I have read yet about the republican campaign: Newt Gingrich warning against what in nuclear terms is called EMP, short for an electromagnetic pulse, meaning essentially the electromagnetic shock waves that would follow a nuclear detonation high up in the atmosphere somewhere over the American heartland. In Newt Gingrich’s mind this potential doomsday scenario presents Americans with one of the biggest national security threats in its history, as such a blast would possibly disrupt the nation’s electricity grid for weeks or even months. It is, he says, like going aboard the Titanic knowing it’s going to sink and not putting on the lifeboats.

Would such a blast wreak havoc? Sure, it would, although scientists disagree over its secondary effects. Is such a blast likely to happen? Not very likely say the scientists but if it does, the effects can not be predicted. Besides, they add, it really is the concern of yesterday; its threats are “theoretical” and defending against it would be as straight-forward as against any other type of missile attack. However, the threat itself is all that Newt Gingrich needs in order to argue for the pre-emptive destruction of both Iran’s and North Korea’s missile supplies, something that he would prioritize were he the commander in chief.

While the idea and its consequences sound only a bit more plausible than the threat of enemy scientists cloning the dinosaurs to be used to trample lower Manhattan, it leaves us with three observations (or rather, one observation and two questions). First of all, the guy is stuck in the Cold War, enjoying every fear-mongering minute of it. Second, who are those powerful enemies that would be able to carry off such a technologically complicated blast in the outer atmosphere? Third, can someone please trace which high-tech military hardware companies or which power companies are paying for his campaign? Because I suspect that this “threat” may be a prime example of the military industrial complex at work. Beyond attacking North Korea and Iran, Gingrich’s main arguments in preparing for such an attack is indeed to strengthen the country’s electrical grid and its defenses. While such an investment in the electrical infrastructure is indeed badly needed on its own merits, to safeguard it against EMT would require billions of dollars in protective steps. Meanwhile, millions of Americans are homeless, jobless and without healthcare… (you fill in the rest). But no, those things don’t threaten our national security and they are not paying for Newt’s campaign, so they don’t deserve our attention.

One of the best documentaries on the subject (featuring Gingrich himself): http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/missile/

Related articles

• Gingrich’s Electromagnetic Pulse Warning Has Skeptics (nytimes.com)
• Newt Gingrich Struggling For Women’s Vote (huffingtonpost.com)
• Far-Fetched EMP Doomsday Part Of Cain And Gingrich Foreign Policy Platforms (thinkprogress.org)

Filed under: Concepts and theories applied, International Relations and Security, Peace and Conflict, Uncategorized, Cold War, Electromagnetic pulse, Gingrich, Military industrial complex, Missile Wars, Newt Gingrich, North Korea, Nuclear Threat, Republican, Republican Campaign

A Nuclear Iran – What are Israel’s Choices?

Photo/AFP: Ayatollah Ali Khemenei warning Israel and the US against attacking Iran

To try to understand the message coming out of Israel right now with respect to the Iranian nuclear threat is a little bit like trying to interpret the screen of the SETI project: a lot of noise but no clear signal. While battle cries and sable-rattling has been heard from all quarters—including from Israel’s president Shimon Peres—these warning have done little to change the new reality that Israel faces in the Middle East.

ForIsrael, the publication of the IAEA report onIran’s nuclear capabilities changed everything but yet nothing. Israel’s intelligence and defense establishment were quick to point out that the country already possesses much more precise information about the Iranian threat than what was contained in the report. However, one cannot but wonder if Israel’s Iran policy has missed its moment of opportunity. The moment when Israel could stealthily fly a secret mission to knock out a nascent Iranian reactor in one blow without incurring huge costs for itself and its allies, has clearly passed. Even in the best case scenario—using conservative estimates—the risks are likely to far outweigh the temporary benefits. While Israel’s political leadership has gone relatively mum after the report, declaring that the matter is serious and therefore needs to be discussed behind closed doors, the Israeli press and pundits are now feverishly discussing the advantages and disadvantages of the various political and military strategies ahead.

In making these calculations Israel needs to know how far Iran is determined and/or willing to go in carrying out their hostility to the Jewish state. World leaders throughout history who were faced with a similar dilemma customarily chose precaution and always assumed the worst. Thus, mirror imaging has become a useful concept in International Relations, explaining that leaders in wartime often take their own worst thoughts and insecurities and apply them to the other side’s actions. While Western Europeans mostly interpreted Ronald Regan’s Cold War resurgence in the 1970’s as his own personal paranoia, due to the complexity of the US political system (that we will not go into here), American foreign policy is often simplified to the Black/White or “us” vs. “them” perspective. However, while Regan’s paranoia indeed turned out to be partly that, Israel’s situation is a bit different. Israel has first-hand experience of hostility from its neighbor states; in Israel (as one friend explained) if Ahmedi-Nejad says he wants to kill you, you’d better believe him or you may be dead before you have time to change your mind.

It is against this backdrop that it is interesting to consider what Iran will really choose to do and what Israel’s choices are given Iran’s actions. Princeton game theorist and political scientist, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita famously predicted (in a 2009 TED Talk presentation) that Iran’s leaders would make the choice to develop enough weapons-grade plutonium and expertise to build a bomb but would stop once that objective and know-how had been attained. According to the IAEA report Iran has now clearly reached that point, and it seems to me that Professor Bueno de Mesquita should be in for his own personal nail-biter, at the end of which it will be determined whether his most famous and widely publicized prediction of the three last years will hold true. I imagine that he may tell us that predictions may shift when external circumstances change and that Iran’s policies may also be determined by Israel’s actions. What then are Israel’s real choices in confronting Iran?

Out of the policy pundit chatter it seems that Israeli politicians are currently presented with three (although arguably only two are relevant) long-term policy choices. The first option, the creation of a Middle Eastern nuclear-free zone, is for all intents and purposes currently unavailable and, although peaceniks may argue for this vision, most analysts understand that such a regime could only come about after decades of trust and reciprocity or as a result of major regime change in Iran. The second alternative is to use direct force against the Iranian nuclear facilities in order to neutralize the threat and stop the Iranian WMD project in its track. The “use of force” sounds fairly simple and straight forward in reality is not one clear choice but a myriad of smaller difficult decisions that all have a million consequences and costs attached. As we know from recent history, “quick force” usually never succeeds other than in the eyes of the strategists or in glorified historic accounts. The International Relation theorist, Fred Charles Ikle, concluded that the resort to force—or even an escalation of violence—never manages to achieve its desired aims without enormous “unpredicted” costs often neglected by the war hawks. Ironically, Ikle argues, the possible gains from an escalation in violence are always overestimated while the costs are underestimated. The 2003 decision by the US administration to invade Iraq while characteristically refusing to heed those who had more “grounded” opinions seems to prove his point.

What then are the possible costs and consequences of an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities? Most likely, explains Douglas Bloomfield in an op-ed in the Jerusalem Post, the costs would be devastating, not only to Israel and the US, but potentially also to the rest of the region and to the entire world. In all likelihood, Iran would make good on its promise to close the Straits of Hormuz, which bears more than a third of the world’s supply of oil and gas. That would put them into position to target theUS fifth fleet and hit a number of US military and commercial facilities in the Gulf. It would also threaten US efforts to stabilize bothIraqandAfghanistan.Iranwould also not hesitate to attack US-friendly Arab states, further endangering the world’s oil supply and putting financial markets in a tail-spin.  In addition, the danger to Israel from a direct attack by one of Iran’s long-range Shahab missiles can not be underestimated; neither can the danger from more energized terror groups closer to home, such as the Hizbullah and Hamas.

There are also larger and more long-term questions: even if Israel would deem it absolutely necessary to use force, what exactly would they strike, and what will they do the day after? Israel is in no position to occupy a country, and it cannot rely on the US to do so. Most importantly, as Bloomfield also points out, an Israeli strike would provide proof to the Iranians that they were right and that there indeed was justification for building the bomb in the first place. At the most, according to US secretary of defense Leon Panetta, Iran’s nuclear plans would be set back by 2-3 years while solidifying their conviction that nuclear warheads are both desired and required. While we may be hopeful that Iranians will be next in rising up against their leadership, a military attack may instead serve to unify the population behind the government at a time when the Iranian opposition needs to be supported and energized.

But then again, what are the costs for the alternative? What if, as Yossi Melman wrote in Haaretz, the smoking gun is an Iranian nuclear missile? In contrast to the stability of the arms race between the US and the USSR, a nuclearized Middle East presents Israel and the rest of the world with an accutely serious threat. Tzahi Hanegbi, former head of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, points out that the dilemma that Israel faces in this respect is real. If Iran goes nuclear, he argues, Arab states in the region have vowed not to stay behind. Thus, rather than a “nuclear free” zone in the Middle East, we may see a regional scrambling for weapons, reducing Israel’s edge against its neighbors and increasing the risk that those weapons fall into the hands of terrorists or unstable Islamic states.

These scenarios leave Israeli decision makers between a rock and a hard place and it is easy to see why there are those who argue passionately for force, overestimating the perceived benefits and underestimating the costs. Israeli s facing a similar—though arguably much more dangerous and precarious—situation to that of the US vis-à-vis Iraq in 2003. By not taking “early action” and attacking the Natanz facilities three years ago, Israel has “opted” to either begin (or provoke) a regional war with Iran or to live with a changed power-balance in the Middle East and the almost certainty of a Middle East nuclear arms race. Thus, while the IAEA report changed nothing forIsrael, it represents a momentous paradigm shift. Rather than a continued reliance on its own nuclear program as a weapon of last resort against its neighboring Middle Eastern states, Israel will have to refocus its program towards the larger goals of nuclear deterrence. Such a shift will necessitate a new diplomatic agendathat focuses on long-term trust-building, rather tha the more short-term reliance on overwhelming military force.  Skills that Israeli policy makers need to perfect are those needed for political manoeuvring, bargaining and negotiation, rather than that of military brinkmanship.

The Israeli Nuclear Plant in Dimona in Southern Israel, believed to contain a nuclear bomb.

The third option, the “status quo,” may sadly be the wisest and perhaps the only choice Israel has. However, while in strategic terms “status quo” means to do nothing, in nuclear terms it requires a little more, namely the active policy of nuclear deterrence. Israel has arguably enjoyed almost 30 years of military (and nuclear) superiority in the Middle East, which most likely helped in deterring conventional aggression from its neighbors. However, with the new reality emanating from Teheran, International Relations students around the world may have gotten themselves a new test-case of a regional power rivalry. If this is indeed the case, Israel’s military will need to refocus its nuclear capabilities from first-strike capability (being able to strike an opponent first) to second strike capability (being able to absorb, or deflect, a nuclear attack and still have the ability to retaliate), terms that IR students often struggle to comprehend because they seem to belong to a by-gone era of ancient Cold War politics. Unless something drastic happens, this is where Israel is likely to be heading. One may only hope that the chance of regime change in Iran is greater than both of the options presented above.

 

Professor Bruce Bueno de Mesquita talks about his book on the Daily Show with John Stewart in 2009: http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/mon-september-28-2009/bruce-bueno-de-mesquita?xrs=share_copy

Filed under: Concepts and theories applied, International Relations and Security, Middle East, Uncategorized, A Nuclear Iran, deterrence, Israel's Iran policy, Middle East arms race